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Abstract   The development of political engagement in early life is significant given 
its impact on political knowledge and participation.  Analyses reveal a large influence 
of parents on their offspring’s curiosity about politics during their teenage years. 
Increasingly, civic education is also considered an important influence on political 
interest and orientations of young people as schools are assigned a crucial role in 
creating and maintaining civic equality. We study the effects of civic education on 
political engagement, focusing especially on whether and how civic education can 
compensate for missing parental political socialization. We use data from the Belgian 
Political Panel Study (2006-2011) and the U.S. Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study 
(1965-1997), which both contain information on political attitudes and behaviors of 
adolescents and young adults, those of their parents, and on the educational 
curriculum of the young respondents. Our findings suggest that civics training in 
schools indeed compensates for inequalities in family socialization with respect to 
political engagement.  This conclusion holds for two very different countries (the U.S. 
and Belgium), at very different points in time (the 1960s and the 2000s), and for a 
varying length of observation (youth to old age and impressionable years only).   
 
 
Keywords: Civic education, political engagement, young people, latent growth curve 
analysis. 
 
  
 1 
Acknowledgements: The supplementary material, the code to replicate the 
recoding of the data and model estimation, as well as the data of the Belgian Political 
Panel Study (BPPS) can be downloaded from www.aneundorf.net/Publications. The 
data of the U.S. Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study can be accessed from the 
University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center and Center for Political Studies 
(ICPSR, study number 4037): http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04037.v1. We would like to 
thank Marc Hooghe and his team for allowing us to use the BPPS dataset. Special 
thanks go to Ruth Dassonneville and Ellen Quintelier for answering our many queries 
in relation to the BPPS project. We presented earlier drafts of this paper at the 
following workshops and conferences: the 12th Dutch-Flemish Political Science 
Conference Politicologenetmaal (Ghent, Belgium, May 30/31, 2013); the workshop 
“Young people’s politics” (Lincoln, UK, September 5, 2014) organised by the PSA 
Specialist Group on Young People and Politics; the conference  “Inequality of active 
citizenship: Can education mend the gap?” (London, UK, May 28/29, 2015) organized 
by LLAKES and AMCIS; as well as the workshop on “The crisis for contemporary youth: 
opportunities and civic values in comparative, longitudinal and inter-generational 
perspective” (London, UK, June 4/5, 2015) organized by LLAKES. We would like to 
thank the panelists for their useful comments. Lastly, we are grateful for the 
constructive feedback of the three reviewers and the editor of Political Behavior. 
 2 
It has long been known that the family plays an important role in the political 
socialization of pre-adults, notably with respect to party identification (Campbell et 
al. 1960), but also with respect to a host of other political attitudes and behaviors, 
including political interest (Hyman 1959, ch. 4; Jennings and Niemi 1966).  The 
sources of parent-offspring correspondence are varied, including deliberate teaching 
by parents, but also the socioeconomic environment shared by family members and 
even genetic inheritance (Alford et al. 2005).  Whatever the mechanism, the influence 
is substantial and long lasting (Jennings et al. 2009; Zuckerman et al. 2007).  
Increasingly, civic education is also considered an important influence on knowledge 
and political orientations among young people (Galston 2001; Niemi and Junn 1998), 
even though the precise mechanisms by which classroom instruction and 
organization influence students are open to debate (Torney-Purta 2002; Campbell 
2008; Martens and Gainous 2013; Kisby and Sloam 2012). 
A less settled question is how family and school interact.  In particular, does 
civic education, broadly conceived, reduce differences among youths that originate in 
the family, or does it possibly enhance pre-existing differences?  Can civics training 
make up in some way for having come from a household in which there is less access 
to academic and similar resources and less interaction related to political news and 
the public sphere generally?  Can schools, in other words, compensate for what 
Levinson (2012, ch. 1) calls the “civic empowerment gap” between young people 
from privileged backgrounds and those from impoverished backgrounds? Or, to the 
contrary, does classroom instruction widen the gap by primarily benefiting those who 
begin civics classes with a high degree of pre-existing political knowledge and 
awareness? 
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These questions are important inasmuch as civic education, especially in the 
United States where much of the research has been conducted, has long been 
thought to be key to the development and maintenance of a democratic system in 
which all citizens have the knowledge, skills, and attitudes to understand and 
influence their government.  Everyone, so the argument goes, should be part of an 
enlightened citizenry, and to the extent that differences exist, schools play a crucial 
role in creating and maintaining civic equality (Guardian of Democracy nd, 13; Levine 
2007, 119, 152; Händle et al. 1999, 264).  Much as the Head Start program in the 
United States was intended to provide an opportunity for children from poor 
economic environments to develop strong academic skills, one purpose of civic 
instruction is to assist children from politically barren backgrounds develop the 
knowledge and skills to participate on an equal footing in the political sphere.  Using 
the vocabulary of recent research into this role (Campbell 2008; Gainous and Martens 
2012; Persson 2014), a function of civic education is to compensate for possible 
deficiencies in knowledge, skills, and attitudes among those whose family 
backgrounds or socialization have left them behind their wealthier or more involved 
classmates. 
In this paper, we consider the compensation question with respect to political 
engagement, with a particular focus on whether civic education makes up for 
differing levels of family socioeconomic status and frequency of student-parental 
political discussions.  Using the three waves of the Belgian Political Panel Study (2006-
2011) and the four waves of the U.S. Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study (1965-
1997), we find that compensation does occur.  We note, in addition, that the most 
important school variables are the amount of formal civic education and the inclusion 
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of group projects, but not classroom climate. 
 
Parental Socialization and Civic Education in the Literature 
That the family plays a role in political socialization has never been in doubt.  Studies 
of current and recalled parental partisanship suggested close correspondence 
(Campbell et al. 1960), a fact that was later confirmed by interviews with youths and 
their parents (Jennings and Niemi 1966; Westholm and Niemi 1992; Jennings et al. 
2009; Kroh and Selb 2009).  Agreement on other matters proved to be not as strong, 
but similarities existed and were found to persist as teenagers turned into young and 
then even older adults (Jennings and Niemi 1981; Jennings et al. 2009). 
How much influence comes from civic education is a more controversial matter.  
Education itself is highly correlated with political knowledge, interest, and voter 
turnout and other forms of political participation. Yet it has been repeatedly 
suggested that this connection might exist largely because education serves as a 
proxy for social class or cognitive ability, or that education simply serves as a sorting 
mechanism that divides the population into higher and lower statuses (Nie et al. 
1996; Campbell 2009).  These and similar questions about the effects of education 
mean, in David Campbell’s words, that “we know relatively little about the civic 
development of adolescents.  Specifically, we have a limited understanding of how 
schools do, or do not, foster political engagement among their adolescent students” 
(2009, 438). 
With respect to civic education per se, the uncertainty is much greater.  For a 
long time, it was argued that civic education and the curriculum more broadly had 
almost no influence at all on students’ attitudes (Langton and Jennings 1968).  That 
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proposition has been under fire for well over a decade now (Niemi and Junn 1998; 
Nie and Hillygus 2001).  Still, the precise way in which schooling influences students is 
unclear.  One possibility, of course, is that civics instruction itself – the classes 
students take that teach about one’s government and one’s role as a citizen – is the 
causal agent.  Even then, the influence may stem from specific features of the class – 
whether it consists mostly of lectures, incorporates class discussions, involves 
students in group projects, and so on.  Another possibility, which has found support 
from a major cross-national study, is that the climate of the classroom – how free 
students feel to express their opinions and have them discussed and respected – 
underlies student attitudes, political engagement, and even political knowledge 
(Torney-Purta 2002).  Community service, which may or may not be a part of formal 
classroom instruction, is yet another factor that may influence youths’ feelings and 
actions about civic and political participation (Finlay et al. 2010).  
 Further adding to the complexity of school effects is how they interact with 
family and other outside influences.  If one of the goals of civic education is to create 
and maintain civic equality, one might hope that schools compensate for the 
substantial inequalities that students bring with them.  Families vary considerably in 
the extent to which they introduce their children to the political world.  Some parents 
provide a rich literacy environment, often operationalized simply by the number of 
books found in a home (Campbell 2008; Evans et al. 2010; Persson 2014).  Their 
children are provided with a basis for learning of all sorts, political and otherwise. 
Similarly, some parents are themselves politically active, or they may display an 
interest in politics through frequent discussions and media use, while others eschew 
any mention of politics.  The compensation hypothesis asks whether schools have 
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more influence on youths who are less strongly socialized by their families.  Does civic 
education, in whatever form, in some way make up for the absence of strong family 
effects?   
There is some evidence in support of the compensation hypothesis.  The early 
findings of Langton and Jennings (1968) suggested that civics coursework, though 
generally ineffective, might have a positive impact on children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds.  Strongly supportive evidence was recently found by Campbell and 
Niemi (2015), who uncovered a disproportionate effect of high-stakes civics exams on 
immigrant and Latino students’ political knowledge.1 In a study of the open classroom 
effect, Campbell (2008) found that “exposure to an open classroom climate at school 
can partially compensate for the disadvantages of young people with low 
socioeconomic status,” more strongly influencing low SES students’ appreciation of 
conflict in politics and their anticipated turnout behavior.  In a quasi-experimental 
study of a newspaper-in-the-school program in Argentina, Chaffee et al. (1998, 161) 
reported what they dubbed “gap-closing patterns” in indices of media use, political 
discussions, political knowledge, and tolerance.  
Yet not all tests have supported the compensation hypothesis.  Campbell’s 
(2008) positive results did not extend to civic knowledge, and Persson (2014), in a 
study similar to Campbell’s, found no compensatory effect on civic knowledge in a 
Swedish panel study or in the full 28 countries of the IEA civic education study from 
which Campbell drew his American sample.  And Gainous and Martens (2012), using 
                                                 
1
 Humphries, Muller, and Schiller (2013) reported that the academic rigor of high school course work 
(but not the number of social science credits) had a greater positive effect on the likelihood of 
registering to vote for Latino children of immigrants than among white third-generation-plus young 
adults.   
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the same data as Campbell but different operationalizations, found that open 
classrooms did have a greater effect on political knowledge among students from 
lower than average “home environments” but a smaller effect on intent to vote.2 In 
the Belgian study that underlies our work, Hooghe and Dassonneville (2011, 333), 
found a mix of compensation, acceleration (greater learning among those with initial 
high levels) and no effect depending on the civic education variable involved.3   
 
Theorizing the Relationship between Parental Socialization and Civic 
Education 
To the extent that civic education leads to heightened political engagement, it is likely 
to have a greater impact on some groups than others. Here we argue that the relative 
impact of school political education depends on the extent of political socialization 
happening at home. We expect that for those that do not get introduced to politics by 
their parents, civic education in school is more important for becoming politically 
active. The interaction of civic education and parental socialization can be explained 
in relation to starting levels of political engagement while the children are still at 
school and in relation to the subsequent development of levels of political 
engagement as young people age.  
Firstly, in relation to the starting levels of political engagement, we expect that 
students from lower SES families and less intellectually stimulating households 
receive lesser amounts of political input. This implies lower starting levels of political 
                                                 
2
 A study of a political event (specifically a U.S. presidential campaign) also showed mixed evidence – a 
kind of compensation with respect to candidate evaluations (Sears and Valentino 1997, 56-57). 
3
 Hooghe and Dassonneville interacted students’ initial knowledge levels and classroom characteristics, 
thus looking only indirectly at compensation for limited family socialization.  
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engagement. Based on the compensation hypothesis, we expect civic education to 
boost political engagement especially for those from less political families, as school 
education and activities are their way to understanding and engaging with politics. 
This effect is observed at the time that children are in school and are exposed to civic 
education.  
The second effect of civic education on young people’s political engagement is 
on the subsequent development as adolescence age after leaving school. Four 
possible effects spring to mind: a compensation effect, an acceleration effect, a 
ceiling effect, and a left-behind effect. In the literature, compensation is usually 
considered akin to a catching-up process as individuals age, or in the language of the 
modeling presented below, during the growth process. Such a catching-up process 
suggests that civics classes will have their greatest impact on the development of 
political engagement for young people with less exposure to political information at 
home, in their social networks, and through the media. Whatever the reason for the 
relative absence of political stimuli, youths with diminished interest and information, 
so the argument goes, are likely to gain more from school classes – civics classes in 
the study at hand. In other words, this group is likely to close the gap between 
themselves and those coming from politicized families during the growth process as a 
result of their exposure to civic education classes.  Assessing which aspects of civic 
education matter more or less is also one of the aims of this research. 
The compensation hypothesis rests on the assumption that acquisition of at 
least a minimal understanding of politics is necessary to stimulate greater 
engagement.  Without some understanding of how government works or who the 
players are, learning more about or participating in the “sport” is difficult (just as 
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learning detailed rules of baseball or rugby or any other sport, much less taking part 
in it, can be difficult if one does not know the basics).  Some people learn about 
politics at home, while others need to compensate for a lack of political information 
at home by learning the basics of the political process in school.  
A related point, of course, is that for many people political engagement does 
not come easily. The measure we utilize here, detailed below, includes a question 
about interest in “societal issues and politics.” Aggregate political interest increases to 
some degree during adolescence and early adulthood (Neundorf, Smets, and García 
Albacete 2013), but it does not change easily or greatly (Prior 2010). A strong 
stimulus is therefore needed, and for students with little prior awareness, a class 
devoted specifically to the subject may provide that push while young people are still 
in school. We could hence also expect that for disadvantaged pupils that come from 
apolitical homes, taking a civics course alone pushes-up their initial political 
engagement, closing the gap to the children from political families.  
Moreover, politics “are usually of rather low visibility,” so the effects of 
socialization are likely to “be triggered by the intervention of exogenous political 
events” (Sears and Valentino 1997, 47). Though Sears and Valentino were writing 
about election campaigns, civics classes can be considered an exogenous occurrence 
as well, since students are typically required to take such a class (at the secondary 
school level) rather than selecting it because of prior interest in the subject. 
While the compensation hypotheses suggests that those from families with 
low levels of political socialization gain most from civic education, those from high 
SES backgrounds and from families where political discussions frequently take place 
may also gain something from civic education classes. One possibility is that of an 
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acceleration effect. We expect those coming from highly politicized families to have 
higher starting levels of civic education.4 Acceleration, the opposite of compensation, 
implies that greater learning takes place among those with high initial levels of 
political engagement based on their prior political knowledge and understanding, 
which makes learning in school easier. This means that the development of political 
engagement is steepest among this group, possibly widening the gap between 
themselves and those who are initially less highly socialized.  
However, there might also be a ceiling effect for those from highly politicized 
families. Higher starting levels of political engagement may leave less room for 
growth in levels of political engagement as young people age. The ceiling effect would 
thus imply political engagement to be relatively stable from an early age onwards for 
this group. Moreover, having already been engaged means that new kinds of 
opportunities must come along for them to become even more highly engaged. That 
could happen, of course, but it seems relatively unlikely to occur in an ordinary 
classroom setting. The underlying dynamic is similar to what Sears and Valentino 
(1997) found with respect to information received during the presidential campaign; 
adults were little affected by the information they received because it was largely 
consistent (or perceived as consistent) with their long-term understanding of the 
parties and their existing evaluations of them. If there are ceiling effects among the 
highly politicized, any gains by those who are initially less politicized are likely to close 
the gap – i.e., there will be compensation.   
The fourth and final effect is what we call the left-behind process. Those coming 
                                                 
4
 Since parental socialization processes already occur before young people are exposed to civic 
education classes, our general expectation is that those from families with high levels of socialization 
have the highest starting levels of political engagement, whereas those from less politicized 
backgrounds have the lowest starting levels of civic education. 
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from families with lower levels of political socialization are hypothesized to have 
lower starting levels of political engagement. Without the stimulus of civic education 
classes, or with minimal or poor civics education generally, this group is likely to stay 
behind peers coming from politicized backgrounds that permit them to benefit from 
civics classes. In other words, without civic education classes or other stimuli to give 
them the necessary foundation for learning, it will take those with a poor family 
socialization background a long time, if ever, to catch up in terms of political 
engagement. 
In short, the compensation hypothesis suggests that if education in general 
plays a role in creating and maintaining civic equality, civic education classes help 
those with fewer political resources to catch up with their peers who come from 
families with high levels of political socialization. The acceleration hypothesis, on the 
other hand, proposes that those from highly political families have higher starting 
levels of political participation and that their subsequent development is also steep. 
According to the ceiling hypothesis, these very same people have less steep growth 
trajectories as only new kinds of learning opportunities will increase their levels of 
engagement. The left-behind hypothesis, lastly, stipulates that those from low SES 
backgrounds and with low levels of civic education lag behind their peers and take a 
long time to catch up.   
Thus, the first question we investigate is which elements of civic education and 
parental socialization matter for the starting levels and development of political 
engagement during adolescence and young adulthood. Then we assess how the two 
factors interact, aiming especially to determine the extent – if any – to which civic 
education compensates for a low level of parental political socialization. We focus on 
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various facets of the civic education curriculum (formal civic education, open class 
room climate, active learning strategies) but also on the various ways in which 
parents may influence their offspring’s political attitudes and behaviors (through 
socioeconomic status, intellectual environment, and frequency of political 
discussions). We consider the effect of these factors on a political engagement index 
that gauges the extent to which students follow socio-political issues. 
 
Data and Variables 
The main empirical test of the compensation hypothesis uses the rich data of the 
Belgian Political Panel Study (BPPS).  The three waves of the study were carried out 
between 2006 and 2011.  The panel offers information on political attitudes of 
adolescents and young adults between the ages of 14 to 24.  Respondents were, in 
addition, asked about their educational curriculum as well as their parent’s political 
attitudes and behaviors.5 
Respondents were first interviewed in 4th grade (equal to grade 10 in the U.S. 
system). The 2006 survey, in which 6,330 adolescents participated, was 
representative for region, school type, gender and educational track. The 
respondents were surveyed again at school in 2008 and through regular mail in 2011 
as they had left high school by then. Respondents who had changed schools or 
dropped out of school received the 2008 survey by regular mail.  In the second wave, 
4,235 pupils (67%) of the first wave participated and of these 3,025 respondents 
                                                 
5
 Belgium is an established democracy that offers a common core curriculum to pupils in secondary 
education, as is true for many other European countries (European Commission 2014). It is, moreover, 
unexceptional in Europe with regard to the level and development of political engagement (Torney-
Purta 2002).  We thus have no reason to believe that Belgium would be an unusual case with respect 
to civic education, which is in the focus of this study.  
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(71.4%) participated again in the third wave (for more details see Hooghe et al. 2011 
and Hooghe et al. 2015). Only those respondents who had participated both in 2006 
and 2008 were contacted for the third wave (see Hooghe et al. 2011, 19). Our 
analyses are thus based on a dataset including only those respondents who 
participated in all three waves of the panel study (2,821 respondents).6  
Our focus is on one dependent variable: an index of political engagement.7 The 
political engagement index gauges the extent to which respondents follow societal 
issues and politics. It is based on three questions: one asking how often a respondent 
reads, watches or listens to the news (also on the internet), a second measuring how 
interested the respondent is in societal issues and politics, and a third assessing how 
often the respondent discusses politics or problems in society when (s)he is with 
good friends (for the exact wording of all questions see Appendix A). The political 
engagement index ranges from 1 ‘never reads or watches the news/not 
interested/never discusses politics’ to 5 ‘reads or watches the news daily/very 
interested/always discusses politics’. The Cronbach’s alpha for the index increases 
from 0.54 in 2006 to 0.61 in 2008 and 0.65 in 2011.8 The distribution of the political 
                                                 
6
 The main reason for requiring participation in all three waves is a methodological one, as it is 
required by our modeling strategy – latent growth curve modeling.  This means, however, that we only 
work with 44.6% of the original sample. In the online Appendix I, we compare the demographic 
attributes, civic education scores, parental socialization, and the mean dependent variable for those 
who dropped out of the panel in either 2008 or 2011 and those who remained in the panel throughout 
all three waves. The main and significant differences relate to the demographic attributes (see also 
Hooghe et al. 2011, 16).  Those who dropped out of the panel were on average 5 months older in 
2006.  Also, more boys and respondents from Wallonia dropped out. Further, those who remained in 
the panel had higher educational aspirations (37% aimed to go to university in 2006, compared to only 
25% of those that dropped out of the panel).  Our models control for all these variables, which makes 
it less problematic that the three-wave panel is somewhat less representative than the initial wave.  
Regarding the key variables (civic education scores, parental socialization, and civic engagement), the 
differences between the two samples are very small and negligible. We therefore do not believe that 
panel attrition affects our conclusions. 
7
 See Ansolabehere et al. (2008) for more on the advantages of using indexes to measure attitudes and 
behavior.  
8
 A factor analysis confirmed that all three items load very strongly on only one dimension (Eigenvalue: 
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engagement index is very close to normal (see Appendix C), which fulfills one 
requirement for modelling continuous-level variables. 
Since the main goal is to assess the extent to which civic education classes 
compensate for missing parental socialization, our main independent variables of 
interest are various measures of parental and educational influences asked in the first 
wave in 2006.9 Starting with the latter, we largely follow Dassonneville et al. (2012) by 
looking at formal civic education, open classroom climate and active learning 
strategies. In doing so, our study focuses on different facets of civic education classes 
studied by various other researchers (see e.g. Campbell 2008; Finlay et al. 2010; Kisby 
and Sloam 2012; Martens and Gainous 2013; Torney-Purta 2002). Most of the civic 
education measures are based on multiple questions and all are aggregated at the 
class level in the first wave of the panel in 2006.10  
Formal civic education refers to conversations about socio-political issues and 
institutions in class and is measured through a number of questions on how often on 
a scale from 1 ‘never’ to 4 ‘often’ the following topics were discussed in class: 1) the 
way parliament works; 2) the United Nations; 3) the European Union; 4) federalism; 
                                                                                                                                            
2.387; proportion: 0.478). To make sure that using an index as a dependent variable does not influence 
our results, we also estimated our models with the single independent variables (political news 
consumption, political interest, and political discussion). The results are presented in Appendix F and 
are largely the same as those presented in results section below. 
9
 As discussed in the methods section below, we are modelling the change in the dependent variable 
as respondents age. We treat the initial parental socialization and civic education as the starting points 
that (at least partly) predict the initial level of political engagement observed in the 2006 wave, when 
respondents were between 14 and 20 years old (average = 15.7).  
10
 Students are clustered in 337 classes in 108 schools. There are between 1 and 47 pupils per class, 
with an average of 14 pupils per class. Using the average score of civic education per class accounts for 
measurement error, as it is expected that some students under- or over-report the amount and 
content of their civic education. See Dassonneville et al. (2012) for more on this topic.  In order to 
assess whether the civic education measures are affected by varying reliability due to changing class 
sizes, we replicated our models with those in classes of at least 10 pupils.  Appendix H reports the 
results of these models, which are based on 1,485 pupils in 110 classes. The substantive conclusions 
remain the same.   
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5) elections; and 6) recent political events. The Cronbach’s alpha for the formal civic 
education measure is 0.81 in 2006.  
Open classroom climate is measured on a scale from 1 ‘totally disagree’ to 4 
‘totally agree’ and taps whether students: 1) felt encouraged to develop their own 
opinions; 2) felt free to express their own opinion in class, even when it deviates from 
the majority; and 3) were under the impression that their teacher provided several 
views on topics in class. The Cronbach’s alpha for open classroom climate is 0.60 in 
2006. 
The presence of active learning strategies, lastly, is measured through three 
different indicators.11 The first records overtly political contacts – i.e., whether pupils 
visited the parliament or town hall as part of their civic education course and 
whether any politicians or important people in society came to give a talk in class. 
The ‘visits’ measure runs from 0 ‘none’ to 2 ‘both activities’. The second measure of 
active learning strategies measures how often students had to engage in group work 
for which they received a joint grade in the past year (1 = never, 4 = often).  Group 
work is thought to foster one’s ability to work cooperatively and understanding of the 
efficacy of coordinated behavior, both key elements of active political engagement.  
The third and last indicator of active learning strategies measures on a scale from 0 
‘no’ to 3 ‘more than 20 hours’ whether and how much voluntary work students were 
obliged to do by their school.  Such work is often thought of as a kind of “new 
engagement” that may be replacing more traditional modes of political behavior 
(Zukin et al. 2006). 
                                                 
11
 We refrained from putting the three indicators into an index measuring active learning.  First, each 
item taps different forms of active learning, some being explicitly political (visits to the parliament and 
from politicians) and others being very unspecific (group work).  Second, as the alpha coefficient of 
0.04 indicates, these items are empirically unrelated.  
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The second set of independent variables aims to tap various parental 
socialization influences. We focus on family socioeconomic status, the overall 
intellectual atmosphere of the home and the frequency of student-parent political 
discussions. Parental socio-economic status is measured through the average 
educational level of the mother and the father of the respondent (ranging from 1 
‘lower secondary education’ to 4 ‘a university diploma’).12 The intellectual character 
of the home is assessed through the estimated number of books students have at 
home (ranging from 0 ‘none’ to 6 ‘more than 500’).13 Next, we include a dummy 
variable measuring whether parents are considered the respondent’s main source of 
information about problems in society and about politics. We also measure on a scale 
from 1 ‘never’ to 4 ‘always’ the frequency with which students discuss politics or 
problems in society with their parents. Since all civic education and parental 
socialization variables are measured from less to more, in principle we expect a 
positive relationship between each of the measures and our dependent variable. 
Lastly, we also include a number of control variables in our analysis. The first is 
age. Following a standard life-cycle hypothesis we expect that levels of political 
engagement increase over the life span. We also include a dummy variable for gender 
(1 = female) with the expectation that females are less politically engaged and less 
politically active. To control for the educational level of the students we include a 
                                                 
12
 We decided to capture the average educational attainment of the parents rather than including the 
education of the mother and the father separately.  First, the education of the parents is reported by 
the children themselves. We hence hope that by averaging the education of the parents, we account 
for possible over- or under-reporting.  Second, the education of parents is highly correlated (r= 0.54) 
and we hence feel confident that we capture a family status rather than a maternal or paternal 
influence only.  We nevertheless ran the models separately for mothers’ and fathers’ education and 
find the same, insignificant, effects as for the combined parental education. The results are available 
upon request from the authors.  
13
 The number of books at home is often used as a proxy for the parental status (Campbell 2008; 
Persson 2015), though the modest correlation with parental education (r=0.35) suggests that it taps 
into something else as well. 
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dummy variable selecting those respondents who aspire to go to university.  Since the 
Belgian educational system is stratified, with educational tracks that are considered to 
be of different quality, we also include a dummy variable selecting those in the 
highest educational track (general secondary education), which prepares students for 
higher education.14 We expect these two variables to be positively related to the 
dependent variable. Because Belgian schools can be strictly divided between Dutch- 
and French-language schools (i.e. there are no bilingual schools) we also include a 
dichotomous variable to capture the differences between the two Belgian language 
communities. Appendix B reports the full list of descriptive statistics for all variables 
analyzed below. 
 
Latent Growth Curve Modeling 
We are interested in the way civic education and parental socialization affect the 
development of political engagement during adolescence and young adulthood. This 
implies intra-individual variation as we assume that – on average – levels of political 
engagement increase with age.15 We also expect to observe differences in starting 
levels and growth patterns between respondents. Some have high levels of political 
                                                 
14
 While the educational tracks in Flanders and Wallonia are slightly different, in general, there are 
three different tracks in the Belgian secondary education system: a vocational, a technical, and a 
general track. Anyone with a secondary education diploma is free to enroll in post-secondary 
education.  However, those taking the vocational track have to take an extra year in post-secondary 
education.  Moreover, the success rate for those coming from vocational and technical tracks is lower 
than for those from the general track, which prepares students for higher education (not surprisingly, 
this is also related to factors such as socio-economic status). We categorized the educational track 
variable into a dummy, as the tracks below the general secondary education track differ slightly 
between Flanders and Wallonia and a more nuanced distinction is therefore problematic. 
15
 As a robustness check, we also estimated our growth models as a function of time instead of as a 
function of age. The results are presented in Appendix G and show very few differences to the models 
estimated with age.  We present the models with growth as a function of age in the remainder of this 
paper, as the theoretical expectation is that levels of political engagement increase with the life 
experiences that accompany the ageing process. 
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engagement from an early age onwards. Others, however, might have low levels of 
political engagement when they are young but become more active over time and 
catch up with their more politically engaged peers. 
Latent growth curve (LGC) modeling is a statistical methodology that allows us 
to study between-person differences in within-person change. Each respondent has a 
unique trajectory as they age through the estimation of random slopes and random 
intercepts (cf. Bollen and Curran, 2006; Preacher et al., 2008; and van Ingen and van 
der Meer, 2016, for a recent application in political behavior). The actual scores of the 
dependent variable – the level of political engagement – during adolescence and 
young adulthood are not of primary interest. Rather, repeated individual observations 
are used to estimate an underlying trajectory or line that best describes this growth 
of political engagement for every individual in the sample over the three waves of the 
panel study that we have at our disposal.  
Figure 1 illustrates these individually fitted trajectories for the first ten (random) 
respondents in our sample. The bold line shows the overall development of political 
engagement of these young adults. From this illustrative picture it becomes apparent 
how growth curve models work. Clearly respondents differ in their initial level 
(intercepts) of the dependent variable. Moreover, as Figure 1 shows, respondents 
also differ in their growth or development in political engagement as they age.  While 
some have a steep increase, some have decreasing levels of engagement as they pass 
through the crucial years between childhood and adulthood. 
 
< Figure 1 about here > 
When estimating these trajectories, three questions are crucial: First, what is 
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the mean starting level and further development of political engagement for the 
entire sample? This is captured by the mean intercept and mean slope, which are 
comparable to the standard OLS regression coefficients. Second, to what extent do 
individual trajectories deviate from the mean? Lastly, how can we explain this 
variation? The latter can be done through the incorporation of explanatory variables 
to better understand the variability observed in individual trajectories. For the 
present paper these questions can be reformulated as follows: What is the average 
trajectory of political engagement over time in our sample of adolescents and young 
adults? Is there significant individual level variance in the intercepts and slopes, i.e., 
in the observed starting levels of political engagement and the subsequent 
development or growth as respondents age? And most importantly, to what extent 
do parental socialization and civic education explain these individual differences?  
In order to answer these questions we first need to examine the overall 
development of political engagement as well as the amount of deviation from the 
mean (questions 1-2). Subsequently we include covariates in the model to predict the 
individual trajectories (question 3). LGC models assume the existence of continuous 
underlying latent trajectories, which track how levels of political engagement change 
or develop for each person, as they grow older. The following is the trajectory 
equation for an unconditional LGC model, which does not consider covariates 
affecting the latent trajectories (see Neundorf et al. 2013 for a more detailed 
description of the method): 
yia = αi + λβ βi + εia 
where yia is the observed value of the variable y – in our case political engagement – 
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for the ith case at age a, αi is the random intercept, representing the initial level of 
political engagement for respondent i. βi is the slope for i, measuring the ‘true’ rate of 
change for each individual as they grow older.  λβ is a vector that measures the 
functional form of the aging process.  
Assuming a linear growth function, we get a constrained rate of change in the 
repeated measures of political engagement that is constant across all periods.16 
Besides the growth factor λβ, the variances of the intercept (ψαα) and the slope (ψββ) 
are important components in an LGC model. They provide a measure of the variability 
of individuals on this growth function. The larger these variances are the more people 
differ with regard to their development of political engagement. If we want to try to 
explain these individual differences we can include covariates (X), such as parental 
characteristics and measures of civic education. The aim is to estimate the effect 
these factors have on the unobserved, underlying (latent) trajectory of our 
dependent variable. 
Important in the LGC models we present in the next section is the distinction 
between fixed effects and random effects. The fixed effects explain the intercept, i.e., 
the starting level of political engagement at the age of 14 when respondents were 
first interviewed. The random effects explain the slope, i.e., the development of levels 
of engagement as respondents age. Positive random coefficients indicate a faster 
than average growth or development, whereas negative coefficients point to a 
                                                 
16
 We assume a fixed (linear) parameterization of the growth function of political engagement during 
the (pre-)adulthood years, which is partially due to data restrictions and partially for theoretical 
reasons. Bollen and Curran (2006) show that three waves are the minimum requirement for testing a 
linear model (see also the more recent study by Little 2013).  In any event, Prior (2010) and Neundorf 
et al. (2013) found that the growth of political engagement between ages 17-25 is linear and then 
flattens or stabilizes. 
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depressed growth rate. Rather than thinking of positive or negative slopes, one 
should thus think in terms of steeper or flatter slopes when interpreting the results 
presented in the next section. 
 
Results 
This section has a two-fold aim. First, our analyses are aimed at understanding 
whether civic education and parental characteristics influence starting levels and the 
subsequent development of patterns of political engagement among young citizens. 
We then ask whether civic education can compensate for differing levels of family 
socioeconomic status, intellectual environment and frequency of student-parental 
political discussions. Before presenting the statistical results, we present the data 
descriptively.  
 
Explorative Analyses 
To explore the relationship between parental socialization, civic education and our 
dependent variable descriptively, we divided respondents according to levels of 
family discussion levels and formal civic education. The former is based on the 
average political discussion of parents with their children (mean: 2.1 on a 1-4 scale). 
Those above the average are classified as having high levels of parental socialization. 
Similarly, we classified respondents who received above average formal civic 
education as having high levels of civic education (mean: 1.7 on a 1-4 scale). Based on 
these two classifications, we can differentiate four different types of respondents. 
Table 1 reports the distribution of these types: 41.2% of all adolescents have civic 
education that is below average and discuss politics less frequently than the mean. 
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On the other side, 11.8% have above average civic education and parental 
socialization.   
< Table 1 about here > 
 
In a next step, we plot the average development of political engagement for 
these four different types of respondents. Figure 2 illustrates the compensation 
hypothesis in an explorative way. We simply fitted a straight line of the growth in 
political engagement for these four types. The order of these different types of young 
adults in terms of the dependent variable is as expected – those who reported high 
levels of parental socialization and high levels of civic education in the first panel 
wave are also most politically engaged at all ages.  Conversely, those with low 
parental socialization and low civic education are always least interested and 
politically active.  
For our research, the important question is how parental socialization and civic 
education affect the initial level and subsequent development of political engagement 
as adolescents age. For this, we can compare the intercepts and slopes of the four 
types illustrated in Figure 2. In terms of initial political engagement, children from 
political families are more engaged at an early age than those from family 
backgrounds that are less political regardless of the levels of civic education. 
However, Figure 2 also confirms that civic education has a boosting effect in initial 
political engagement, as levels are higher among those that received civic courses in 
school, holding constant parental socialization.  
Turning to developmental processes, those with low parental socialization but 
high civic education have the steepest development of political engagement over the 
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age-span analyzed here. In other words, civic education seems to allow these 
students catch up with their peers from families with higher levels of parental 
socialization. This confirms the compensation hypothesis for this explorative analysis. 
It is further interesting to note that those with high parental socialization always 
show higher levels of political engagement, independent of whether they experience 
civic education in school. This confirms previous research that overall, the impact of 
parental socialization is very strong.  The growth trajectory of those coming from 
families with high levels of parental socialization is less steep, which suggests the 
existence of a ceiling effect.  Importantly, those with both low parental socialization 
and no civic education also increase their engagement, suggesting that other factors 
are also at work. 
< Figure 2 about here > 
 
Latent Growth Curve Models 
In the next step, we estimate latent growth curve models, which statistically test the 
descriptive results presented in Figure 2. We thus model the slopes for each 
respondent (not just four types) and test whether the level and form of parental 
socialization and civic education affect the starting levels and growth in political 
engagement. The results are shown in Table 2,17 which reports the results of three 
different models.18 Model 1 includes only age and tells us the average starting levels 
of engagement at age 14 and the average growth rate of the dependent variable as 
                                                 
17
 Note that we include only respondents who answered all questions in our models. We report the 
results of the full sample in Appendix E. Reducing the sample to 6,565 observations (i.e., 2,190 
respondents over three time points) does not change the results.  
18
 We additionally estimated the models separately for parental socialization and civic education rather 
than estimating both sets of variables together. The results are generally the same and are available 
upon request from the authors.  
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our respondents age. In Model 2 we look at factors that influence the intercept, i.e., 
the starting level of political engagement, by including fixed-effect class-level 
indicators of civic education and fixed-effect parental socialization variables measured 
in the first wave of the panel study in 2006. This model – as well as the subsequent 
ones – also includes the control variables. As noted, however, we are interested not 
only in seeing which elements of the civic education curriculum and of parental 
socialization influence starting levels of political engagement; we also want to know 
how they influence the development of political engagement as respondents grow 
older. Therefore, in Model 3 we include random effects variables by interacting our 
indicators of civic education and parental socialization with age as the growth 
parameter.    
< Table 2 about here > 
Turning to the results, Model 1 shows that our 14 year old participants have a 
staggeringly low political engagement starting level of 1.27 on a scale of from 1 ‘never 
read or watch the news/not interested/never discusses politics’ to 5 ‘reads or 
watches the news daily/very interested/always discusses politics’. Levels of political 
engagement on average grow .09 points with every year that passes. At this rate, we 
expect that political engagement at the age of 25 to be 2.36. This modest growth rate 
shows that political engagement is already relatively stable at an early age (see also 
Prior 2010; Neundorf et al. 2013). Nonetheless, the growth over, say, a five-year 
period is significant. Moreover, as the variance component of the slope parameter 
indicates, there is significant variation in the development in political engagement in 
our sample. It appears that the variance in the intercept (2.302) is much larger than in 
the slope coefficient (0.007), with both being significant at the 1% level.  
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The fixed-effects of civic education and parental socialization in Model 2 
explain the variance among respondents at the age of 14. Of the civic education 
variables only formal civic education and group projects influence starting levels of 
political engagement. Both coefficients are positive, so the more often socio-political 
issues and institutions are discussed in class and the more often students engage in 
group work, the higher are the starting levels of political engagement.  
Turning to the socialization measures, we find that the number of books at 
home and the frequency of political discussion with parents positively influence the 
intercept of political engagement. In contrast, having one’s parents as the only source 
of political information makes children have lower levels of political engagement at 
the age of 14. There is no direct effect of parents’ education level. The significant 
drops in the log-likelihood19 and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) indicate that 
parental socialization and civic education explain variation in political engagement at 
the age of 14 very well.    
In Model 3 the random effects variables show how our civic education and 
socialization measures influence both the starting level and the development of 
political engagement. Formal civic education still matters for the intercept at the age 
of 14.  Being obliged by school to volunteer also has a weakly significant and positive 
effect on starting levels of political engagement, but the effect on the growth curve is 
negative.  This implies that those who volunteer have a depressed growth rate as they 
age. The frequency of group work influences the starting level of political 
engagement negatively but has a positive and significant effect on the development 
                                                 
19
 We estimated a log-likelihood ratio test for all models. Including the fixed-effects on the intercept as 
well as including the random effects on the slope coefficients significantly improves the model 
compared to Model 1, which simply models the mean growth parameters for each respondent.  
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of engagement as the respondents age.  Thus, while those who engage in group work 
on average have lower starting levels, their levels of political engagement develop 
faster than those who did not engage in group work in their class. 
As for the parental variables, having parents as the main source of political 
information is once again found to have a negative effect on the starting levels of 
political engagement, and the variable does not influence subsequent development. 
In contrast, a higher frequency of discussion of socio-political issues with parents 
heightens the level of political engagement at age 14. Yet while starting levels are 
higher when parental political discussion is frequent, the same variable has a 
dampening effect on the development of engagement. This supports the ceiling 
effect of parental socialization. 
Based on the results of Models 2 and 3 we can reject the expectation that an 
open classroom environment, active learning strategies such as school visits, or 
parental education have an impact on the initial level or the development of political 
engagement among young people. Turning lastly to the control variables presented in 
Table 2, we see that girls have lower average levels of political engagement than boys. 
Those who at the age of 14 aspire to go to university and those in the highest 
educational track have higher levels of political engagement. These results are all as 
expected. The differences between the two language communities are not 
statistically significant. 
A remaining question is how much of the intra- and inter-individual variation is 
explained by our models. The variance components in Table 2 provide us with 
answers to this question. The variance component for the intercept tells us how much 
variation there is in the starting levels of political engagement at the age of 14. Model 
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1 shows significant variation in starting levels and this variation remains significant, 
but lower, once covariates are included in the model. The variance component for the 
slope indicates the extent to which there is variation in the development or growth of 
engagement as our respondents age. Model 1 confirms that there is significant 
variation in the growth curves. While the amount of variation decreases substantially 
with the inclusion of covariates, not surprisingly we do not manage to explain away 
all between-respondent differences in growth trajectories. Clearly there are other 
factors driving the development in political engagement in young adulthood that go 
beyond parental socialization and civic education. 
 
Testing the compensation hypothesis  
While Models 2 and 3 in Table 2 help us understand which measures of civic 
education and parental socialization matter more or less when it comes to explaining 
variation in the starting levels and subsequent growth of political engagement, the 
results presented in Table 3 assess the compensation hypothesis more specifically. In 
these models we include an interaction effect between civic education and parental 
socialization.  
< Table 3 about here > 
The results presented in Table 3 report the nine possible combinations of 
parental socialization (measured by political discussions at home, parents as the main 
source of political information, and books at home) and civic education (measured as 
formal civic education, group work, and volunteering) that were found to be relevant 
in Table 2. In order to test the compensation hypothesis, we include two interaction 
terms. First, we include the interaction effect of parental socialization and civic 
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education to show how they affect the initial level of political engagement. A positive 
coefficient suggests that young people who are exposed to high parental socialization 
as well as high civic education are more likely to have a higher starting level in 
political engagement. Second, the models include a cross-level interaction term, 
which captures how parental socialization and civic education jointly affect the 
development of political engagement as young people age. A positive coefficient 
suggests that young people who are exposed to high parental socialization as well as 
high civic education are more likely to have a steeper growth level in political 
engagement. 
All parental and school variables are included as control variables on the 
intercept. However, for reasons of parsimoniousness, we only include one measure 
for parental socialization and one measure of civic education at a time to affect the 
growth process of political engagement.  
For example, the results of Model 1 in Table 3 present the interaction model 
between political discussion with the parents (as a form of parental socialization) and 
formal political education (as a measure of civic education). Both variables are 
included as main effects on the intercept (grey cells), as main random effects on the 
slope and the interaction effect of these two variables on the starting level (b = -
0.241) and the development (b=0.010). Neither the interaction term for the intercept, 
nor the interaction term for the slope are statistically significant.  
Looking at the general pattern of these interaction models, the results confirm 
the consistent strong positive effect of parental socialization on the starting levels of 
political engagement of their children. Discussing politics with one’s parents and 
having many books at home, boost initial political engagement. Also, consistently for 
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those who see parents as the main source of political information, political 
engagement is lower, which is somewhat surprising and might suggest that this 
variable does not fully capture political socialization. When it comes to civic 
education, we also find that formal education and group work increase initial political 
engagement. Once we take into account the effect of group work on the 
development of political engagement (Models 7-9 in Table 3), we find the same 
pattern already presented in Model 3 in Table 2. Group work initially suppresses 
political engagement, but has a strong positive effect on the growth process (b=0.033 
to 0.063).   
The key to the results of Table 3 is of course in the interpretation of the 
interaction effects. In each instance, the signs of the two interaction effects flip 
between negative and positive effects. In all cases in which the initial interaction is 
positive, the growth process is negative (and vice versa). This pattern disconfirms the 
acceleration effect. Civic education – if anything – does not increase the civic 
empowerment gap based on parental socialization. Overall, however, the interaction 
effects are not significant.  
However, the overall significance of these coefficients is somewhat misleading, 
as the effects can still be significant at certain values of the variables. In order to 
interpret this complex interaction model within the LGC model, it is necessary to plot 
the predicted values. Figure 3 plots the predicted values for four different types of 
respondents for two of the possible nine combinations of variables,20 similar to Figure 
2. However, in this instance these values are not descriptive, but predictions based on 
the results of the LGC model presented in Table 3, with important control variables 
                                                 
20
 All nine corresponding figures of predicted values based on the results in Table 3 are presented in 
Appendix D.  
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held constant. The figures present separate predictions of the trajectories of political 
engagement. The solid lines represent respondents from non-politicized families (no 
political discussion with parents) and the dashed lines represent respondents from 
very political families (frequent political discussions with the parents). We further 
divide the respondents in Figure 3a, based on Model 1 in Table 3, into those 
frequently discussing political issues in school (civics=high) and those not receiving 
very good formal civic education (civics=low). Based on Model 7 in Table 3, Figure 3b 
plots the predicted political engagement for those that participated in group work in 
school (group=high) and those not doing any group-work in school (group=low).  
< Figure 3 about here > 
The first striking result presented in Figure 3a and 3b is the sharp difference in 
the initial level of political engagement. Parental socialization clearly has a positive 
effect on their children’s political engagement at an early age. We further find 
support for the expected ceiling effect, which is evident from the flat trajectories (in 
three of four instances) for children from political homes. Especially for those that do 
not profit from good civic education – whether formally or informally through group-
work – political engagement virtually does not develop after the age of 14/15.  
We find strong evidence for a compensation effect for children from non-
political homes who engage in group-work in school. They start off being significantly 
less politically engaged than those from political homes until the age of 20, when 
their political engagement has caught-up. The compensation effect is less strong for 
formal education. However, here too trajectories seem to be slightly steeper for those 
from a-political homes who profit from good formal civic education. These 
respondents are clearly developing political engagement more strongly than those 
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from political homes but who do not have formal civics courses in school. Moreover, 
Figure 3a clearly confirms that those that profited from good civic courses in school 
have a boost in their initial level of political engagement.   
Lastly, Figure 3 presents evidence of the left-behind effect. Levels of 
engagement of the group of children that neither has a political environment at home 
nor profits from a good civic education clearly stays behind. They remain consistently 
(also in the other possible interactions; see Appendix D) and significantly below the 
levels of political engagement of the other groups. We further find that the left-
behind group would need much longer to catch-up to levels of political engagement 
comparable to the other groups.  
 
Robustness Test: The Long-term Effects of Civic Education 
Our results presented above are based on data from one country only at a specific 
time in history. We investigated the development of political engagement for the 
crucial formative years between 14 and 24 (Bartels and Jackman 2014). Our 
conclusions based on this data are hence limited to the case, time, and age. To make 
our conclusion more generalizable, we replicated the models presented above using 
the Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study (YPSPS; Jennings et al. 2005),21 which is 
based on a nationally representative sample of 1,669 United States high school 
seniors from the graduating class of 1965. Subsequent waves conducted in 1973, 
1982, and 1997 resulted in a panel of 935 respondents who participated in all four 
waves. Similar to the BPPS, the YPSPS includes information on political engagement in 
each wave as well as information about school curriculum and political discussions 
                                                 
21
 Jennings and Niemi (1966, 1981) and Jennings et al. (2009) provide more information about the 
data. 
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with parents in the first wave. The questions are comparable to the ones used in the 
models above.22 However, the measure for civic education is limited to an indicator 
capturing whether respondents had any civics courses (rather than the type of civics 
courses), which 70% reported they had.  
The advantage of using the YPSPS data is that it covers a much longer time period.  
While the Belgian panel data only cover the ages 14 to 24, the U.S. data allow us to 
follow individuals between the ages 17 and 50. We are hence able to track the long-
term effects of parental socialization and civic education as well as their interaction. 
Table 4 reports the results of the latent growth curve model, parallel to the Belgian 
results presented in Tables 2 and 3. Model 4 in Table 4 assesses the compensation 
hypothesis in the U.S. case. We generally find a small positive growth process of 
political engagement. Every year respondents age, they become 0.014 points more 
engaged - on a scale from 1 to 4. Independently, civics courses in school (b=0.554; 
p<0.05) as well as discussion about political affairs with the parents (b=0.289; p<0.01) 
boost the initial level of political engagement. The negative interaction term (b=-
0.120; p<0.1), however, shows that jointly, there is no acceleration effect in the U.S. 
either. For children from very politicized homes, civic courses in school do not seem 
to matter much. We further find support for the ceiling effect, as high parental 
socialization dampens the growth in political engagement as the children age (b=-
0.003; p<0.1). There is further a small, insignificant direct negative impact of civics 
courses on the growth process. The interaction between parental socialization and 
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 The exact question wording of the variables is reported in Appendix J. To measure political 
engagement, we used political interest and news consumption only.  Unlike in the BPPS, there was no 
comparable measure for political discussion over time, which was hence not included in the index. We 
measure parental socialization using frequency of discussion with family about public affairs. We did 
not include parental education, which did not prove to be of significance in the Belgian or the U.S. 
models. There was no question about the number of books in the home.  
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civic education on the development of political engagement is – as it is in the Belgian 
case – insignificant.  
< Table 4 about here > 
Again, due to the complexity of this interaction effect in the LGC model it is 
necessary to plot the predicted values. Figure 4 plots the development of political 
engagement dividing the 1965 high school graduating cohort into four distinct 
groups, parallel to the ones presented in Figure 3. The figure shows the respondents 
having or not having civic courses in school as well as those with below and above 
average (mean: 3.1) political discussion with parents.23 
 
< Figure 4 about here > 
The most striking result of Figure 4 is the stability of political engagement, 
especially for those who profited from a strong parental political socialization, 
confirming again the ceiling effect hypothesized above.  The respondents who grew 
up in less politicized families need a considerable length of time to catch up with the 
levels of political engagement of the former group. Respondents who had a civics 
course in high school seem to get an initial boost in political engagement, shifting the 
intercept, and also stabilize relatively early in their level of political engagement. This 
is evidence of the compensation effect. In line with the left-behind effect, 
respondents who neither had politically active parents nor civic education in school 
need the longest to become politically engaged. It takes them until the age of 30 to 
                                                 
23
 Note that the average political discussion with the parents in the U.S. in 1965 is much higher than in 
Belgium in 2006 (mean: 1.7). Both variables are measured on a scale 1 to 4, where 4 represents almost 
daily political discussions at home. Similarly, the average political engagement in the U.S. in 1965 
among high school seniors is 3.15 (on a scale of 1 to 4), compared to 2.65 (on a scale 1 to 5) in Belgium 
in 2006. Based on these and other comparable measures, it appears that generally today’s youth in 
numerous countries is much less political than previous generations were, at least on conventional 
activities (e.g., Howe 2010, Wattenberg 2012). 
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close the gap with those from similar family backgrounds that profited from school 
civic education. Both groups only caught-up with those from very political families at 
the age of 50, when no significant differences in political engagement levels exist 
anymore. 
 These findings are in line with previous research on the development of 
political interest that showed that political interest generally stabilizes around the age 
of 25 (Prior 2010; Neundorf et al. 2013). But it appears that there is some 
heterogeneity, depending on parental socialization (high = stabilization appears 
earlier) and civic education (low = stabilization appears later).  Based on Figure 4, we 
conclude that civic education helps to compensate for missing parental socialization, 
as respondents get an initial boost in political engagement. Those not exposed to 
politics in their youth at all – whether at home or in school – need the longest to 
catch up and only gradually become relatively politically engaged. These additional 
analyses furthermore strengthen the generalizability of our conclusions, as we can 
replicate the same patterns across very different countries and time periods.  
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
The literature on political socialization increasingly recognizes that both parents and 
schools – the latter in the form of civic education – influence the political attitudes 
and behavior of children, including teens.  Of course, not all family and school effects 
are equal.  The principal objective of our study was thus to understand whether civic 
education could compensate for a lack of parental political socialization.  If one of the 
goals of civic education is to create and maintain civic equality, one might hope that 
schools, at least to some degree, make up for the considerable inequalities that 
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originate in the family.   
 The answer found in our analysis is positive: the compensation effect exists for 
political engagement.  While our findings suggest that high levels of parental 
socialization and civic education boost starting levels of political engagement at the 
age of 14, civic education – especially in form of group-work – affects the 
development of political engagement for respondents from less political families 
more.  Across different cases and periods, we consistently find that respondents who 
are both disadvantaged by their family background and who do not profit from civic 
education in school are left behind. This group needs much longer to develop similar 
levels of political engagement than those from political families and, importantly, 
those that are exposed to good civic education. Here we find that civic education in 
school – formal and informal – can boost the level of political engagement early in 
life. This substantially reduces the empowerment gap caused by family background.  
The importance of this result can hardly be overestimated.  In Campbell’s 
(2008, 451) words, “it is particularly significant that civic education in school appears 
to have the potential to partially compensate for the persistent class bias in political 
engagement.”  To the extent that one of the historic goals of schools (at least in the 
U.S.) has been to assist immigrants and marginalized groups in general to participate 
effectively in the political system, it appears as if they are achieving what they were 
designed to do. 
 That we have found evidence of compensation in two countries at very 
different historical times (cohorts of young people from the 1960s and 2000s) and for 
varying lengths of observations (youth to old and impressionable years only) is 
especially encouraging.  Widespread (though not universal) supportive evidence 
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indicates that compensation effects now have to be considered a leading hypothesis 
of the role civic education plays in the development of youthful political orientations.   
 Beyond our findings regarding compensation as such, the details of our more 
extended analysis of the Belgian Panel Study are also worth noting.  Utilizing three 
waves from 2006-2011, we estimated latent growth curve models, making a 
distinction between factors that influence the starting levels of engagement and 
participation at the age of 14 and factors that influence the development or growth 
as respondents age. Formal civic education, volunteering, and political discussion 
with parents affected starting levels of political engagement positively.  Group 
projects turned out to have a negative effect on starting levels; however, the 
frequency of group projects was the only school variable to positively affect the 
growth rate of political engagement.  The other statistically significant variables – 
volunteering and acquiring political information mainly from parents – lead to a 
flatter growth rate.  Overall, these findings are encouraging in the sense that civic 
education classes are found to have an impact on the political engagement of young 
citizens even after they leave the secondary educational system. Most important, 
however, is that civic education appears not only to have an important socializing 
effect on young people, but it as well contributes to the democratic goal of making 
citizen involvement more equal as well. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 Distribution of high and low parental socialization and civic education in 2006 
(%). 
 
Civic low; parent low 41.2 
Civic high; parent low 31.7 
Civic low; parent high 15.4 
Civic high; parent high 11.8 
 
Data: Belgian Political Panel Survey 
(BPPS), 2006-2011.  
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Table 2 The effects of civic education and parental socialization on the development 
of political engagement (in Belgium). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) 
Age .091***  (.004) .091***  (.004) .136***  (.053) 
Fixed-effects (measured in 2006)  
 
   
Girls 
 
 -.209***  (.023) -.210***  (.023) 
French-speaking 
 
 -.002 (.033) -.003 (.033) 
Educational goal: university 
 
 .130***  (.026) .130***  (.026) 
Educational track: highest 
 
 .152***  (.034) .152***  (.034) 
Class-level variables: 
 
 
 
   
Formal civic education 
 
 .181***  (.049) .474*  (.261) 
Open classroom climate 
 
 0.057 (.062) 0.23 (.292) 
Active learning: volunteering 
 
 -0.064 (.072) .527*  (.276) 
Active learning: visits 
 
 -0.019 (.082) 0.128 (.381) 
Active learning: group projects 
 
 .091**  (.036) -.563***  (.166) 
Parental variables: 
 
 
 
   
Pol. info mainly from parents 
 
 -.184***  (.036) -.438***  (.164) 
Pol. discussion with parents 
 
 .321***  (.019) .903***  (.100) 
Books at home 
 
 .041***  (.009) .044 (.041) 
Parental mean education 
 
 -.008 (.017) -.003 (.082) 
Random-effects (with age)  
 
   
Formal civic education 
 
 
 
 -.016 (.014) 
Open classroom climate 
 
 
 
 -.010 (.015) 
Active learning: volunteering 
 
 
 
 -.034**  (.015) 
Active learning: visits 
 
 
 
 -.008 (.020) 
Active learning: group projects     .037***  (.009) 
Pol. info mainly from parents 
 
 
 
 .014 (.099) 
Pol. discussion with parents 
 
 
 
 -.033***  (.005) 
Books at home 
 
 
 
 .000 (.002) 
Mean parental education 
 
 
 
 .000 (.004) 
Intercept 1.267***  (.080) -.211 (.205) -.998 (.987) 
Variance components 
 
 
 
   
Slope .007*** (.001) .006*** (.001) .005*** (.001) 
Intercept 2.302*** (.274) 1.967*** (.263) 1.723*** (.242) 
N of observations 6,565  6,565  6,565  
N of respondents 2,190  2,190  2,190  
N of classes 314  314  314  
Log-likelihood -6,368  -6,007  -5,967  
BIC 12,788  12,180  12,181  
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by class.  Data: Belgian Political 
Panel Survey (BPPS), 2006-2011. Note: The table reports the coefficients of a latent growth curve 
model, in which age is the growth process. The dependent variable is an index of political engagement 
ranging from 1 “not at all engaged” to 5 “absolutely engaged.”   
Table 3    Testing the compensation hypothesis: Interaction effects of parental socialization and civic education on the initial level (intercept) 
and development (slope) of political engagement. 
 
MODEL M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 
Civic education Formal political education Volunteering Group projects 
Parental socialization Pol. disc. Pol. info Books Pol. disc. Pol. info Books Pol. disc. Pol. info Books 
Age  0.188*  0.075**  0.115*  0.154***  0.099***  0.102***  0.015 0.011 0.013 
Fixed-effects (at 2006) 
        
Girls -0.206***  -0.206***  -0.207***  -0.206***  -0.206***  -0.206***  -0.206***  -0.205*** -0.206***  
Educ. goal: university 0.131***  0.130***  0.131***  0.129***  0.129***  0.129***  0.131***  0.131*** 0.130***  
Educ. Track: highest 0.151***  0.152***  0.149***  0.154***  0.150***  0.153***  0.151***  0.151*** 0.148***  
Class-level variables: 
         
Formal civic education 0.621 0.021 0.357 0.179***  0.181***  0.176***  0.182***  0.180*** 0.181***  
Active learning: volunteering -0.058 -0.059 -0.060 -0.426 0.869*** -0.426 -0.061 -0.061 -0.060 
Active learning: group projects 0.091**  0.091**  0.094**  0.092**  0.094**  0.092**  -0.973 -0.503** -0.562 
Parental variables: 
         
Pol. discussion with par. 1.288*  0.321***  0.320***  0.773*** 0.321***  0.321***  0.426 0.321*** 0.320***  
Pol. info mainly from par. -0.188***  -1.549* -0.187***  -0.187***  -0.168 -0.187***  -0.187***  -1.077 -0.185***  
Books at home 0.042***  0.041***  0.242 0.042***  0.042***  0.059 0.041***  0.041*** 0.053 
Parental mean education -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 
Random-effects (with age) 
        
Civic education -0.017 0.009 -0.005 0.017 -0.049**  0.015 0.063*  0.033*** 0.040*  
Parental socialization -0.049 0.080 -0.008 -0.026***  0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.051 0.002 
Interaction effects (civics * parents) 
        
On intercept -0.241 0.749 -0.063 0.466 -0.781 0.306 0.211 0.326 0.036 
On slope 0.010 -0.044 0.002 -0.024 0.025 -0.016 -0.014 -0.019 -0.003 
Intercept -2.011 0.228 -0.653 -1.148***  -0.219 -0.234 1.158 1.368** 1.197 
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  Data: Belgian Political Panel Survey (BPPS), 2006-2011. Note: Estimates are based on a latent growth curve model. Each model 
reports the results of an interaction effect between one aspect of civic education and one aspect of parental socialization. In each model, the main effects on the starting 
levels of political engagement are highlighted in grey. For scarcity reasons, we did not report the standard errors, but they are available upon request.   
 
Table 4 The effects of civic education and parental socialization on the development 
of political engagement (in U.S.) (YPSPS, 1965-1997). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) 
Age .000 .000 .010***  .014*** 
 
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.005) 
Fixed effects (at 1965) 
    
Girls 
 
-.180***  -.180***  -.181*** 
  
(.030) (.030) (.030) 
Civics classes 
 
.056*  .184***  .554** 
  
(.033) (.057) (.191) 
Parents: pol. discussion 
 
.145***  .206***  .289*** 
  
(.016) (.027) (.049) 
Random-effects (with age) 
  
  
Civics classes 
  
-.005***  -.010 
   
(.002) (.006) 
Parents: pol. discussion 
  
-.002***  -.003* 
   
(.001) (.001) 
Interaction effects (civic edu * par. disc.) 
   
Intercept 
   
-.120* 
    
(.059) 
Slope 
   
.002 
    
(.002) 
Intercept 3.196***  2.799***  2.523***  2.266*** 
 
(.027) (.061) (.097) (.160) 
Variance components 
    
Slope .000*** .000*** .000 .000 
 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Intercept .175*** 0.139*** 0.133*** .133*** 
 
(.035) (.034) (.033) (.033) 
N of obs 3,723 3,723 3,723 3,723 
N of respondents 931 789 789 789 
Log-likelihood -3,375 -3,319 -3,312 -3,312 
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
 
Data: Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study, 1965-1997.   
 
Note: The table reports the coefficients of a latent growth curve model, in which age is 
the growth process. The dependent variable is a political engagement index.   
 1 
 
Figure 1 Individual development of political engagement for 10 random respondents 
(in Belgium). 
 
Data: Belgian Political Panel Survey (BPPS), 2006-2011.  
 
Note: Lines show fitted values of a linear regression of age on political engagement for 10 
random respondents.  
 2 
 
Figure 2 Fitted trajectories of political engagement for four types of respondents (in 
Belgium). 
 
Data: Belgian Political Panel Survey (BPPS), 2006-2011.  
 
Note: Lines show fitted values of a linear regression of age on political engagement by 
respondent type. Low and high civic education is based on or below and above average 
(mean: 1.7) formal civic education. Low and high parental socialization is based on below and 
above average (mean: 2.1) political discussion with parents. Civic education and parental 
socialization are measured in the first wave of the panel in 2006.   
 3 
 
(a) Civics = Formal; Parents = pol. Discussion 
 
 
(b) Civics = Group; Parents = pol. Discussion 
 
 
Figure 3: Predicted values of political engagement by parental socialization and 
formal civic education (in Belgium). 
 
Data: Belgian Political Panel Survey (BPPS), 2006-2011. Note: The figure is based on the 
results presented in Table 3. High parental socialization are those that very often discuss 
politics with their parents and those never discussing politics are classified as low parental 
socialization. A) Formal civic education: high = very often discuss political topics in class; 
low=no formal education. B) Group-work: High = regularly; low = never. The figure was 
created using the command “margins” in Stata 13.   
 4 
 
Figure 4 Predicted political engagement for four types of respondents (in U.S.). 
 
Data: Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study (YPSPS), 1965-1997.   
 
Note: Results are based on estimates reported in Table 4.  Low and high civic education are 
based on having or not having civic courses in school (70% do).  Low and high parental 
socialization are based on below and above average (mean: 3.1) political discussion with 
parents.  Civic education and parental socialization were measured in the first wave of the 
panel in 1965.  
